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Abstract
A puzzle that faces public administrators within regulatory networks 
is how to balance the need for public or democratic accountability with 
increasing demands from interest groups and elected officials to utilize the 
expertise of the private sector in developing process-oriented programs 
that ensure compliance. This article builds upon the network governance 
accountability framework developed by Koliba, Mills, and Zia to explore 
the dominant accountability frames and the accountability trade-offs that 
shape the process-oriented regulatory regime used by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) to oversee and regulate air carriers in the United 
States.
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As industry processes become increasingly complex, regulatory agencies, 
often faced with demands for austerity and reductions in traditional inspec-
tion activities, have relied more on incentives, self-monitoring, and other less 
prescriptive tools to ensure compliance with government regulations and 
industry best practices (Gilad, 2010; Gormley, 1986; Parker, 2002). The shift 
from government-centered to process-oriented regulatory regimes including 
self-disclosure and self-audit programs has led to a proliferation of actors 
from the public, private, and non-profit sectors involved in compliance, mon-
itoring, and oversight functions previously reserved for government agen-
cies. This proliferation of actors has drastically altered the “principal-agent” 
relationship between regulator and regulated firm to one that is increasingly 
transactional and built upon the sharing of information related to the internal 
operation of the firm within regulator networks (Carpenter & Krause, 2015; 
Koliba, Meek, & Zia, 2010). The shift from a traditional principal-agent to a 
transactional and networked regulatory regime has serious implications for 
accountability given the heterogeneous perspectives and motivations of 
actors involved in ensuring compliance. The challenge of ensuring account-
ability in a process-oriented regulatory regime is particularly difficult in com-
plex industries such as aviation.
Over the past two decades, aviation safety regulation has undergone a fun-
damental shift from a government-centered approach focused on governmen-
tal inspections of aircraft and pilots to a process-oriented regime focused on 
information and data exchange between frontline operators, air carriers, and 
regulatory agencies. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has devel-
oped several voluntary disclosure programs in partnership with air carriers 
and employee unions to compliment their traditional inspection activities by 
offering frontline employees the opportunity to disclose violations to the 
FAA or the air carrier for reduced enforcement action. The data collected 
through voluntary disclosures allows the FAA and the air carrier to identify 
safety hazards and trends while also targeting their inspection and audit pro-
grams. In addition, the FAA’s voluntary disclosure programs provide valu-
able secondary information on the safety culture of an air carrier to the agency 
(Mills & Reiss, 2013). While these programs have obvious benefits to both 
the FAA, air carriers and employee unions, an unexplored element of these 
programs is the degree to which they shift the accountability structures of 
both public and private entities responsible for ensuring aviation safety in the 
United States. The aviation industry provides an interesting case to examine 
accountability trade-offs in regulatory networks due to the unique goal con-
gruence (i.e., safety) between regulators and industry, and the significant 
reputation risks presented by an aviation disaster to both air carriers and the 
industry as a whole.
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This article will investigate the dominant accountability structures in the 
FAA’s process-oriented regulatory approach to aviation safety. Adopting the 
network accountability framework developed by Koliba, Mills, and Zia 
(2011), we assess the degree to which process-oriented regulatory regimes 
and the voluntary disclosure programs that are often used to foster informa-
tion exchange between regulated entities and regulators shift traditional con-
ceptions of accountability. Using a dataset of over a dozen interviews with 
aviation safety inspectors and air carrier safety officials along with partici-
pant observations of collaborative safety processes and secondary sources of 
data including Congressional hearings and inspector general reports, we 
describe and analyze the FAA’s aviation safety regime including two of the 
voluntary disclosure programs used to foster information exchange: the 
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) and the Voluntary Disclosure 
Reporting Program (VDRP). We also develop a case study of an incident in 
2010 involving Southwest Airlines (SWA) that illustrates the challenges of 
ensuring accountability in process-oriented regimes. The case studies are 
used to analyze the degree to which voluntary disclosure programs rely on 
complimentary accountability mechanisms that have traditionally been con-
ceptualized as dichotomous or opposed (e.g., democratic and market-based 
accountability mechanisms).
We argue that to have effective process-based regulation, regulators and 
elected officials must design regimes that balance multiple accountability 
regimes to prevent actors from relying solely on their preferred accountabil-
ity mechanisms. Put differently, if regulators rely only on the voluntary dis-
closure of incidents by firms without the threat of other accountability 
mechanisms such as fines or revoking of an operating certificate (i.e., good 
cop/bad cop enforcement strategies), then firms will often rely on the most 
familiar and arguably important accountability mechanism to them: share-
holder accountability. In addition, we argue that balancing accountability 
regimes is easier to achieve for regulators when a third party, in our case, 
employee unions, is given authority to assist in the facilitation of process-
oriented regulatory programs. This suggests that a diversity of interests in the 
facilitation of process-oriented regulatory programs helps prevent actors 
from relying too heavily on one particular accountability mechanism. In our 
case, the presence of employee unions in one voluntary program helps pre-
vent industry from engaging in large-scale regulatory deception while also 
helping prevent regulators from using self-disclosed data in punitive actions 
against employees and air carriers.
While the study presented here is based on two voluntary programs in one 
federal agency operating in a complex industry, we believe that its conclu-
sions are generalizable to a number of other regulatory environments. First, 
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while the alignment and strength of the incentives by all actors in the network 
to ensure safety is strong, several other regulatory arenas such as the regula-
tion of HIV clinics, nuclear power plants, auto industry, and chemical plants 
have similar alignment of goals between regulators and industry (Heimer & 
Gazley, 2012). Second, our analysis is very applicable to other high-reliability 
industries such as nuclear power, deepwater oil exploration, and chemical pro-
duction where one regulatory failure can lead to significant reputation damage 
to not only the individual non-compliant firm but also the entire industry 
(Mills & Koliba, 2015). Finally, the study here analyzes the dominant 
accountability regimes in aviation regulatory networks through routine and 
extreme cases. We feel this approach provides significant leverage to explore 
accountability within networks and is one that lends itself to replication 
across a variety of regulatory environments including food safety (Verbruggen, 
2013), financial regulation (Larson, 2013), and oil exploration (Mills & 
Koliba, 2015).
Framing Network Accountability
Accountability is “the obligation to give an account of one’s actions to some-
one else, often balanced by a responsibility of that other to seek an account” 
(Scott, 2006, p. 175). Extensive literature addresses the complexity of 
accountability in modern states (Behn, 2001; Mashaw, 2006; May, 2007; 
Reiss, 2011; Scott, 2006). The most thorough treatment of accountability 
within regulatory governance networks was conducted by May (2007), who 
used an accountability framework developed by Romzek and Dubnick (1987) 
to show how political, legal, bureaucratic, and professional accountability 
structures vary across prescriptive, process-based, and performance-based 
regulatory regimes. In his examination of regulation in building and fire 
safety, food safety, and nuclear power plant safety, May (2007) found that a 
shift in prescriptive to process-based regulatory regimes has led to a substitu-
tion of professional accountability for bureaucratic accountability structures. 
While this finding is a significant contribution, it does not address the shift 
from a government-centered regulatory approach to one based more on pro-
cess-oriented approaches that are contingent upon certain comfort levels 
among regulators, elected officials, and, to some degree, citizens for more 
market-driven and collaborative regulatory mechanisms. A framework that 
encompasses the role of markets and collaborative ties is needed. A more 
nuanced governance network accountability framework (Koliba et al., 2011) 
allows for a more in-depth analysis of the role that salience and complexity 
play in determining the dominant accountability structures within regulatory 
governance networks by juxtaposing market, democratic, and vertical and 
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horizontal accountability structures. This broadened view of accountability 
allows for the comprehension of more heterogeneous mixture of complemen-
tary and competing factors.
The governance network accountability framework used here was first 
applied to the response and recovery efforts following the landfall of 
Hurricane Katrina to analyze intergovernmental relations in the response and 
recovery efforts (Koliba et al., 2011). Building from Romzek and Dubnick’s 
(1987) seminal work, the authors expanded their accountability framework to 
include not only citizen, legal, bureaucratic, and professional accountability 
but also market-based accountability mechanisms along with collaborative 
accountability often found in governance networks. The authors identify 
three accountability frames: democratic, market, and administrative, and 
found that there was a tension between bureaucratic and collaborative 
accountability structures found within the administrative accountability 
frame, which led to confusion and a breakdown of administrative account-
ability between the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the 
American Red Cross, and other volunteer organizations, as well as failures in 
democratic accountability of the intergovernmental network responsible for 
the preparation, response, and recovery efforts following the disaster. The 
governance network accountability model has been used to examine the 
accountability trade-offs challenging global attempts to develop international 
treaties to address climate change (Zia & Koliba, 2011) and to identify the 
breakdowns in accountability that led to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
(Mills & Koliba, 2015). In the latter, the authors apply the framework to a 
regulatory network and conclude that shareholder accountabilities (directed 
at profit maximization) usurped bureaucratic regulatory controls and profes-
sional standards, and led to the disaster. The FAA case presented here exam-
ines an industry that has had a much more robust legacy of process-oriented 
regulation, due in large part to the extreme emphasis placed upon safety not 
only by the regulator but also by industry. This robust legacy, that we argue is 
still vulnerable, is built on the establishment of a culture of cooperation and 
an authentic participatory decision-making model involving pilots and 
employee unions.
Table 1 outlines the application of the governance network accountability 
framework to regulatory governance networks at the federal level. The frame-
work addresses the explicit standards and implicit norms that guide the rela-
tionship between those rendering account and those to whom accounts are 
rendered. Of particular interest is the market accountability frame, which is 
divided into three distinct, but interrelated, components: shareholder, con-
sumer (Scott, 2006), and labor accountability. Shareholder accountability 
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performance standard. As such, the services, products, and information of 
privately owned firms often are viewed as proprietary objects. Within regula-
tory governance networks, shareholder accountability takes the form of stra-
tegic decisions within firms of how, when, and what information to share 
with regulators. While the field of economics would predict that firms would 
look to design process-oriented or performance-based internal oversight or 
audit programs that minimize cost while providing an acceptable level of 
compliance, scholars have identified several instances where firms have gone 
“beyond compliance” standards established by regulators due to both societal 
pressures and a desire to maintain the organization’s reputational capital 
(Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; May, 2005; Thornton, Gunningham, & Kagan, 
2005; Thornton, Kagan, & Gunningham, 2009; van Erp, 2011). This body of 
literature suggests that shareholder accountability is more than a blind focus 
on profitability and stock price, but rather a multi-dimensional, nuanced, con-
cept built not only on fear of fines for noncompliance but also the desire to 
maintain and enhance the firm’s reputation for compliance.
Consumerist accountability is a market-based accountability predicated 
on the ability of consumers to choose between alternative, competing goods 
or services. Through a consumer’s choice or refusal to purchase, the con-
sumer may be understood as holding a corporation accountable. Within regu-
latory governance networks, consumer accountability is manifested through 
the ability of consumers to alter purchasing behaviors given a firm’s capacity 
to meet regulatory compliance. Traditionally, the ability of consumers to 
examine the firm’s capacity to meet regulatory compliance would be cen-
tered on incidents of noncompliance reported by regulators. However, schol-
ars have examined cases, particularly in the area of environmental compliance, 
where firms will participate in voluntary programs that design and set indus-
try standards that are above the minimum levels, such as the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards (Darnall, Potoski, & 
Prakash, 2010; Prakash & Potoski, 2006). By enacting these costly standards, 
firms can differentiate themselves either as good corporate citizens or safe 
operators in the eyes of their consumers. These government and industry cen-
tered voluntary programs provide more information to consumers to make an 
informed decision about the comparative level of compliance of firms in the 
marketplace.
Labor accountability encompasses the role that workers, be they formally 
organized into labor unions or not, play in market frameworks of account-
ability. Rosenbloom and Shafritz (1985) situate labor’s role in providing 
accountability feedback as the cycling of information about the effect or 
results of the behavior of individual workers or whole labor systems back to 
those individuals or labor systems so that “human behavior or organizational 
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performance might be modified—presumably improved” (p. 252). This kind 
of feedback generated from shareholders or managerial principals to agent-
labor plays a role in ensuring job satisfaction and negotiated understandings 
of performance, rendered at both the individual and collective levels. This 
feedback can be directed in the other direction as well: Workers may provide 
feedback to an organization that may allow for the development of improved 
working conditions, refined modes of production and service delivery, and 
assurances of quality control. Developing such feedback loops was the basic 
premise of total quality management (TQM) efforts in the late 1980s and 
1990s and continues to this day through development of participative deci-
sion-making models (PDM). Research into labor–management relationships 
sheds additional light on the value that these kind of mutually reinforcing 
feedback loops play. An optimal PDM relies on the existence of “viable col-
laborative mechanisms” that are “available and understood by management 
and employees,” premised on an authentic desire to establish “win-win” 
expectations (and realizations) among all parties. PDM requires that a level 
of “trust and mutual respect must exist among the various parties” (Kearney 
& Hays, 1994, p. 47). When this trust and mutual respect exists, and mecha-
nisms for communication and feedback flow between employees, sharehold-
ers, and management, labor accountability is built on the informal capacity of 
individual workers as well as workers organized into collective interests 
(e.g., unions) to hold others accountable.
Angle and Perry (1986) describe PDM as existing within a culture of 
“ambient conflict or cooperation.” Within more cooperative climates, 
accountabilities to and from labor will be based on a level of trust. Cultures 
of conflict between labor, shareholders, and management have led to the 
establishment of organized labor unions.
A cooperative labor relations climate has been found to positively influ-
ence levels of organizational commitment and union loyalty, as well as pro-
ductivity and quality of services (Deery & Iverson, 2005, p. 600). When labor 
unions are present, the role of labor accountabilities is formalized around the 
rights to negotiate contracts, and enter into formal grievance processes and, 
in some cases, strike. These actions provide very explicit ways that organized 
labor can hold market-based organizations, as well as governments that have 
permitted civil servants to organize, accountable.
Thus, the role of labor as a contributor to market-based accountability 
frameworks is shaped by the persistence of conflictual and/or cooperative 
relations with shareholders and management. The FAA case presented here 
highlights the critical role that an ambient cooperative culture, combined 
with formal labor union roles, can play in ensuring that the airline industry is 
safe—an obvious performance standard that is now expected by consumers, 
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elected officials, and citizens in general. Labor’s role in ensuring that safety 
performance goals are attained is clearly highlighted in this case.
Table 1 provides an overview of the entire accountability framework, 
including the democratic and administrative frames in play in complex regu-
latory situations. A detailed description of this entire framework can be found 
in other publications cited in the table heading.
In this study, we explore the dominant accountability structures and the 
trade-offs between accountability frames through an examination of volun-
tary self-disclosure programs operated by the FAA. The FAA’s voluntary dis-
closure programs provide an interesting and theoretically relevant case to 
examine accountability structures for a number of reasons. First, unlike many 
other industries, both the regulated entity (air carriers) and the regulator 
(FAA) have a strong incentive to ensure a high degree of safety regardless of 
cost. The alignment of motives and incentives in aviation safety is unique 
because following an aviation crash or incident, the perception of air travel as 
being “unsafe” can have serious financial implications not just for the air car-
rier involved in the incident but for the industry as a whole (Mills & Reiss, 
2013). In other words, consumers’ fears can affect their decisions to fly, and 
to fly with specific carriers. Second, the collaborative nature of the FAA’s 
voluntary self-disclosure programs provides an appropriate venue to examine 
accountability trade-offs that take place in transactional interactions between 
regulated firms and regulatory agencies. Third, compared with other parts of 
the world, the FAA’s programs are much more mature and well developed. In 
Europe, for example, the EU only recently announced that it would direct its 
safety agency (the European Aviation Safety Agency, [EASA]) to establish 
voluntary reporting programs similar to those operated by the FAA. Finally, 
the FAA case provides an arena to examine accountability structures in both 
routine and challenging regulatory environments.
In this article, we use the FAA case to answer the following question: 
Given the shift to process-oriented regulation rooted in collaborative, trans-
actional authority between regulators and regulated firms, what are the domi-
nant accountability structures in the FAA’s voluntary self-disclosure programs 
and what are the trade-offs between accountability frames that determine the 
effectiveness of the network of actors in ensuring safety?
Method
This article uses a single-embedded case study design (Yin, 2013) by focus-
ing on two separate voluntary disclosure programs within the same agency 
(the FAA). This approach allows for an integrated analysis of the voluntary 
disclosure programs operated by the FAA along with the dominant 
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accountability frames in each program. Yin (2013) argues that single-case 
designs are appropriate for examining unique cases that can shed light on 
new social phenomena. The FAA represents a unique governmental agency 
through which to examine accountability in voluntary disclosure programs 
for several reasons including the historically close relationship with commer-
cial aviation, the history of reform within the FAA due to external perturba-
tions including aviation disasters, the number of actors responsible for 
ensuring aviation safety, the common goal of safety among regulators and 
industry (Mills & Reiss, 2013), and the complex task environment in which 
the FAA operates (i.e., regulate air commerce, promote aviation, manage air 
traffic control, etc.).
The primary data used to develop the ASAP and VDRP case studies are a 
total of 13 interviews and two participant observations (Table 2). Specifically, 
the lead author interviewed three FAA headquarters staff responsible for 
designing and implementing both ASAP and VDRP at the national level, four 
FAA field managers/inspectors responsible for overseeing ASAP and VDRP 
Table 2. Data Used in FAA Case Study.
Interviewee/Observation Organization Date
Voluntary Program Manager FAA November 6, 2009
Voluntary Program Manager FAA February 22, 2010
ASIAS Program Manager FAA February 24, 2010
Inspector FAA February 18, 2010
Principal Inspector FAA February 18, 2010
Inspector FAA April 7, 2010
Inspector FAA April 20, 2010
Program Manager NASA April 1, 2010
ASAP Program Manager Air Carrier April 20, 2010
ASAP Program Manager Air Carrier April 26, 2010
Director of Safety Management 
Systems (SMS)
Air Carrier May 14, 2010
Director of Regulatory 
Compliance
Air Carrier May 20, 2010
General Council Aviation Trade Association June 1, 2010
Event Review Committee 
Observation
Air Carrier, FAA, Labor 
Union
April 27, 2010
Event Review Committee 
Observation
Air Carrier, FAA, Labor 
Union
May 13, 2010
Note. FAA = Federal Aviation Administration; ASIAS = Aviation Safety Information Analysis 
and Sharing; ASAP = Aviation Safety Action Program.
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implementation at four different air carriers, four air carrier managers (from 
four different air carriers) responsible for implementing ASAP and VDRP, one 
NASA official responsible for analyzing ASAP data at the national level, and 
one aviation trade association official who was responsible for creating VDRP 
and who has experience in implementing both programs. In addition, one of the 
authors was granted access to two confidential ASAP Event Review Committee 
(ERC) meetings with two separate air carriers. While the number of interviews 
and observations is fairly limited, the sample of air carriers and their corre-
sponding local FAA offices that were selected by the authors provide a repre-
sentative sample comprised of a variety of air carriers including two major 
legacy air carriers, one low-cost carrier, and one regional carrier. This diverse 
sample of air carriers and local FAA offices also comprised a variety of rela-
tionships between the local regulator and regulated entity, ranging from very 
collaborative to adversarial (see Mills, 2010), which provides additional theo-
retical leverage for assessing the dominant accountability frames that are pres-
ent in both ASAP and VDRP. Individual interviewees were chosen through a 
purposive snowball sampling approach. Specifically, following meetings and 
interviews with FAA headquarters personnel familiar with all VDRP and ASAP 
programs in operation, the authors contacted a sample of FAA local officials 
and air carrier officials listed by the FAA headquarters staff for interviews 
based on the type of air carrier (major, regional, low cost) and the type of per-
ceived interaction (collaborative or adversarial) between the local FAA office 
and the air carrier as identified by FAA headquarter personnel.
Secondary sources of data include scholarly and news accounts of the 
FAA’s voluntary disclosure programs, documentation from Congressional 
hearings, and reports from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and 
Department of Transportation Inspector General (DOT-IG). The secondary 
sources of data were used to develop a detailed account of the SWA incident 
that illustrated the difficulty of ensuring accountability in voluntary disclo-
sure programs. The data collected via the interviews and observations were 
analyzed using an open coding scheme developed to gain insight into the 
behaviors by regulators and air carrier officials in each program. The research-
ers triangulated the coded interview data with several other sources of data 
including GAO and DOT-IG reports, news accounts, and the ERC observa-
tions to derive the in-depth examination and analysis of accountability within 
the FAA’s voluntary self-disclosure programs and the SWA incident.
Aviation Safety Regulation in the United States
The FAA is the primary regulatory agency in charge of air transportation in 
the United States and is tasked with regulating both commercial and general 
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aviation, promoting and encouraging the development of air service, devel-
oping and maintaining a system of air traffic control, and developing pro-
grams that mitigate the environmental effects of air transportation. A major 
task of the FAA is to issue and enforce safety regulations that set minimum 
standards covering manufacturing, operating, and maintaining aircraft. To 
enforce its laws, rules, and certificates, the FAA employs approximately 
4,000 aviation safety inspectors who conduct periodic inspections of air-
men, maintenance operations, and repair stations to ensure compliance. The 
FAA organizes its inspection activities through its Certificate Management 
Offices (CMOs), which is a team of operations (pilots) and maintenance 
inspectors dedicated to oversight of one specific air carrier. The FAA’s tradi-
tional approach to ensuring regulatory compliance prior to 2000 was to use 
its inspector force to conduct spot-checks in the following operational areas:
•• Operations inspections focus on such items as pilots’ certification and 
performance, flight crews’ training, and in-flight record keeping.
•• Maintenance inspections examine an airline’s overall maintenance 
program, including the training of aviation mechanics, the develop-
ment of maintenance manuals, and procedures for repairing aircraft 
and their components.
•• Avionics inspections focus on electronic components of the aircraft.
•• Cabin safety inspections concentrate on cabin procedures, passenger 
safety, and carry-on baggage (United States of America, GAO, 1999).
After a series of crashes in the early to mid 1990s, President Clinton cre-
ated the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security to inves-
tigate new strategies to reduce the number of aviation fatalities. The 
recommendations of the Commission charged the FAA to work more closely 
with industry to establish partnership programs, to more effectively use its 
inspector workforce to oversee industry compliance, and to make better use 
of emerging technologies to proactively identify safety issues (Gore, 1997). 
In response to these recommendations, the FAA developed the Air 
Transportation Oversight System (ATOS) in 1998 to fundamentally change 
the way it conducted oversight of the nation’s largest air carriers. ATOS 
emphasizes a system safety approach that extends beyond periodically check-
ing airlines for compliance with regulations to using technical and manage-
rial skills to identify, analyze, and control hazards and risks. Under ATOS, 
inspectors develop surveillance plans for each airline, based on data analysis 
and risk assessment, and adjust the plans periodically based on inspection 
results (GAO, 2006). The risk-based approach to oversight inherent in ATOS 
is dependent upon detailed operational and human factors data to constantly 
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evaluate areas of risk and hazard within a carrier. The FAA’s limited inspector 
resources made collecting this volume of information impossible.
To gain access to this valuable safety information, the FAA developed a 
suite of voluntary self-disclosure programs that offer a regulatory incentive to 
both air carriers and employees to voluntarily submit incident reports to the 
agency. The FAA uses the data from voluntary self-disclosures and its close 
interaction with industry to proactively target its oversight of air carriers, 
while also identifying systemic areas of safety concern across the national air 
space system. Importantly, the FAA’s traditional inspection processes remain 
a vital part of the agency’s approach to regulatory oversight of air carriers. 
The combination of robust voluntary self-disclosure programs with the FAA’s 
proactive inspection protocols have been credited for the highest level of 
safety in the history of the aviation industry (Mouawad & Drew, 2013). This 
article will examine two of the most prevalent and widely used voluntary 
self-disclosure programs: the ASAP and the VDRP.
The ASAP
Created in 1997, the ASAP is a voluntary disclosure program that allows 
employees of air carriers to report safety-related events without the FAA or 
the carrier taking punitive action against the employee based on the informa-
tion in the report. Unlike other voluntary programs, ASAP involves a partner-
ship between three entities (FAA, Air carrier, and the employee union) that is 
codified through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). A representative 
from the local FAA CMO, air carrier, and the employee union sit on an ERC 
to decide if an ASAP report should be accepted into the program and what 
corrective action, if any, is necessary to remedy the safety concern. ASAP 
provides the FAA and air carriers valuable safety information it would not 
otherwise have access to from those on the front lines of aviation. This infor-
mation is used to proactively identify areas of risk and hazard in a carrier’s 
operation and to develop corrective measures to address these potential safety 
concerns. Today, there are more than 200 active ASAPs spanning a variety of 
employee groups including pilots, mechanics, dispatchers, flight crew, and 
ramp operators. Importantly, air carriers often have more than one ERC—one 
for pilots, one for mechanics, and so on. A recent account estimates that there 
are more than 60,000 ASAP reports submitted annually with the number 
increasing by 20% annually (Johnson, 2012).
The ERC has several responsibilities including reviewing and analyzing 
reports submitted under ASAP, determining through consensus if such reports 
meet the criteria for acceptance into the program (report is made within 24 hr 
of the incident and does not involve intentional neglect such as alcohol use), 
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identifying actual or potential hazards from the information contained in the 
reports, proposing solutions to safety hazards, and conducting an annual 
review of the ASAP database to determine whether corrective actions have 
reduced the reoccurrence of targeted safety events (Kelley, 2010). The ERC 
will also conduct telephone or face-to-face interviews with employees who 
reported more serious violations to engage in a deeper examination of the 
circumstances that led to the incident. This collaborative investigative pro-
cess gives the FAA inspectors much greater access to internal air carrier oper-
ations and procedures than in the past.
A unique feature of the ERC process is that members must come to con-
sensus on both accepting the report into ASAP and the corrective action to 
resolve the safety hazard. This requires a high degree of collaboration and 
understanding of each actor’s political environment. As one air carrier ASAP 
manager noted,
We use four union reps and they rotate one month at a time. I’ve known them 
all for a long time, several of them were chief check airmen for me in my 
previous jobs, so they have a trust in me and how I’m going to approach the 
position, so I would categorize the relationship as excellent. (ASAP Manager 
Interview, April 26, 2010)
An ASAP manager from another air carrier described the trade-offs 
between labor and management that can arise in ERC meetings:
The union representative is the guy that fights the company over every one of 
these disciplinary actions. He is the guy who goes into the boardroom and 
defends the mechanic. It is hard for him to take his hat off. We come in here and 
sit down to do an ASAP and the first thing out of his mouth is how many days 
off did he get? I could care less about that. My goal is to sit down and figure out 
what the hell is the issue and what could we fix. His goal is to figure out what 
punishment the mechanic got. This isn’t the grievance committee, this is the 
ERC. The FAA representative will tell him the same thing. He can be 
argumentative. Don’t get me wrong, I was a mechanic. Most of the time, he 
tries to put a spin on it that the company didn’t hold up their end of the bargain. 
It’s always a training issue, it’s always a manpower issue. It’s not written 
clearly in the policy. (ASAP Program Manager Interview, April 20, 2010)
When the ERC’s proposed corrective action may involve a more systemic 
problem that requires a change to a company policy or procedure, the ERC 
has little authority other than recommending to management that a change be 
made. Some ERCs engage in strategic behavior by waiting to bring an issue 
to the attention of senior management in each of the organizations (FAA, air 
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carrier, union) until a more severe event takes place (ERC Observation, April 
27, 2010).
The data produced through ASAP are used by the air carrier and FAA 
headquarters to improve safety procedures within the air carrier and to better 
target increasingly scarce inspector resources to areas of hazard that are both 
high risk and high probability (Figure 1). Each air carrier is required to have 
a Continuing Analysis and Surveillance System (CASS) to analyze the trends 
within the ASAP and VDRP data and to take corrective action as necessary to 
address those trends. The local FAA CMO also uses the ASAP data trends 
produced through a carrier’s CASS program to identify areas of risk and haz-
ard within the operation. One CMO inspector notes, “Most of the changes 
resulting from ASAP happen at the local CMO level as opposed to the 
national level because most problems identified in ASAP are company-spe-
cific problems” (FAA Inspector Interview, February 18, 2010). Through its 
participation in the ERC and its oversight of the air carrier’s CASS program, 
the local FAA office is better able to gain a complete picture of the air carri-
er’s safety culture and is well positioned to assess whether or not the carrier 
is “gaming” the system by encouraging its employees only to report minor 
rather than more serious violations through both ASAP and VDRP.
Figure 1. Relationship between FAA Inspections and voluntary self-disclosure 
programs.
Note. FAA = Federal Aviation Administration; CMO = Certificate Management Offices; ATOS 
= Air Transportation Oversight System; ASAP = Aviation Safety Action Program; VDRP = 
Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program; ERC = Event Review Committee.
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In addition to using ASAP data at the local level, the FAA wanted to be 
able to mine this valuable source of data at the national level to look for sys-
temic safety issues across air carriers. However, according to some of our 
informants, air carriers and employee unions were very concerned about 
turning identified ASAP reports over to the national FAA office to be shared 
among competitors. As one air carrier official noted, “The program lives and 
dies on confidentiality. As soon as that trust is violated, reports will dry up 
and no one will tell anything” (ASAP Program Manager Interview, April 26, 
2010). To ensure the confidentiality of the air carrier and the employee in 
ASAP reports, the FAA decided to contract with the MITRE Corporation to 
provide computer servers at each participating air carrier to house their de-
identified ASAP and VDRP data. The FAA, in consultation with MITRE, 
developed Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS), which 
is a collaborative government and industry initiative on data sharing and 
analysis to proactively discover safety hazards, leading to timely mitigation 
and prevention. Once approved by a joint-industry-FAA board, MITRE con-
ducts queries of ASAP and VDRP reports on its servers so that the actual data 
do not leave the carrier’s premises, and the compiled dataset is de-identified 
by carrier.
To further protect the confidentiality of voluntary self-disclosures, 
Congress passed and the FAA implemented an order that makes all materials 
submitted under the ASAP and VDRP, including reports, ERC conversations, 
a carrier’s database of records, trend data of ASAP reports, safety publica-
tions, and so on, exempt from the Freedom of Information Act. In addition, 
ASAP and VDRP materials are not discoverable in legal proceedings against 
employees or air carriers (Mills, 2010).
The VDRP
The VDRP is a program that offers certificate holding air carriers reduced 
regulatory enforcement actions if they voluntarily report systemic problems 
within their operation and work collaboratively with their local FAA office 
on designing a comprehensive fix to the problem. For example, an air carrier 
could self-disclose to the FAA that they were out of compliance with an 
Airworthiness Directive (AD) that calls for monthly inspections of rudders 
on 757s. In addition, an air carrier could self-disclose that its pilot training 
manuals were out of compliance with current FAA regulations. For the FAA 
to accept a self-disclosure, it must be reported within 24 hr of the air carrier 
learning of the violation and be the first time the FAA has learned of the vio-
lation. Once the violation is self-disclosed to the FAA, the agency and the air 
carrier work collaboratively to ensure that they have identified the root-cause 
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of the violation and any systemic issues that led to the apparent violation. 
Once the air carrier and the local FAA agree on a corrective action, they work 
collaboratively on implementing the corrective action within the carrier. The 
local FAA office also uses the information contained in the self-disclosures to 
better target its inspections of the air carrier. One of the major differences 
between other voluntary disclosure programs such as ASAP and VDRP is 
that the former are employee reporting programs, while the latter is a com-
pany or air carrier disclosure program. This difference in the level of disclo-
sure coupled with the need to collaboratively fix the problem identified in the 
self-disclosure introduces a different decision-making process than is found 
in employee-level programs such as ASAP. As the Director of Regulatory 
Compliance for one air carrier noted,
In the self-disclosure process, the company is strategic about what corrective 
actions it recommends. If we have a known issue with the computer system, we 
are not going to go out and buy a new computer system just because there is a 
quirk with it. Could it be fixed? Sure it could be fixed, anything could be fixed. 
Does it make sense to do it? Hell no. (Director of Regulatory Compliance 
Interview, April 20, 2010)
VDRP has a poor reputation among many in the public and in Congress 
due to a high-profile failure of the program that occurred in 2010 involving 
SWA and the FAA office responsive for overseeing it (United States of 
America, DOT-IG, 2014). The incident illustrated the complexities of 
accountability in process-oriented regimes as well as the importance of the 
design of voluntary reporting programs. As an inspector for the FAA at the 
SWA CMO, Charalambe Boutris was responsible for inspecting the airframe 
and systems of the airline’s fleet of Boeing 737 jets. In the course of his 
inspections and as early as 2003, Boutris found that SWA records of AD did 
not meet the requirements of the law. He informed the SWA maintenance 
officials and recommended on numerous occasions to his Supervisory 
Principal Maintenance Inspector (SPMI) Douglas Gawadzinski that they file 
a letter of investigation (LOI) against SWA. Gawadzinski refused the request 
by Boutris and instead told him that a safety attributes inspection (SAI) would 
be conducted to see if the airline was in compliance with federal regulations. 
SAIs are internal audits conducted by the air carrier and reviewed by the FAA 
on a routine basis. One year later, when Gawadzinski approved the SAI with 
Boutris in charge, SWA maintenance officials met with Gawadzinski to have 
Boutris replaced with a “more friendly supervisor” (United States of America, 
House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 
2008). This once again delayed the SAI, which according to FAA records was 
3 years overdue.
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On March 15, 2007, SWA informed Gawadzinski that 47 of their aircraft 
had over-flown the required fuselage fatigue inspection. On March 19, 2007, 
SWA’s Manager of Regulatory Compliance, a former FAA inspector in the 
SWA CMO, filed a VDRP claim with the FAA. However, after the VDRP 
claim was filed, Boutris learned that the affected aircraft continued flying in 
passenger operations until March 23, 2007, and that six of these aircraft had 
up to 4-inch cracks in the fuselage, which can lead to a larger breach of the 
aircraft frame and the rapid depressurization of the cabin (United States of 
America, House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, 2008). On the VDRP application, Gawadzinski falsely con-
firmed that SWA had ceased operations of the planes after they discovered 
the crack in the fuselage. In reality, SWA allowed the 47 aircraft to continue 
in service for up to 30 months after they were due to be inspected. Boutris 
took this information to the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) and the House 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee in August of 2007. The com-
mittee ordered the DOT-IG to conduct a review of the incident.
On April 3, 2008, the House Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, chaired by Representative James L. Oberstar D-MN, con-
ducted a hearing into safety issues at SWA, and possible lapses in FAA over-
sight. In the testimony following the discovery of the violations, it became 
clear that Gawadzinski had fallen trap to the “relaxed culture” in the SWA 
CMO. Specifically, it was determined that Gawadzinski had allowed the non-
compliant aircraft to continue to operate because of a close personal relation-
ship with the Manager of Regulatory Affairs at SWA, who also happened to 
be a former subordinate of Gawadzinski’s at the FAA. This relationship led 
Gawadzinski to trust the intention and general competence of the manager 
and SWA, even as evidence of lapses accumulated. An investigation of phone 
records also found that FAA inspectors were in some instances calling SWA 
maintenance staff to inform them ahead of time of what inspections were 
coming to file VDRP claims before the FAA inspectors discovered the same 
violations (United States of America, House of Representatives, Committee 
on Transportation and Infrastructure, 2008).
In response to the congressional and public concern arising from the SWA 
incident, the FAA ordered an immediate and nationwide audit of other air-
lines, to see if they too had any compliance problems with any AD that 
affected their fleets. Each FAA office that oversees air carriers with aircraft 
seating 10 or more passengers (so-called “part 121 carriers,” as the regula-
tions governing them are found in chapter 121 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations) was asked to audit 10% of the ADs applicable to each aircraft 
type they operate. As a direct result of these “special emphasis” AD audits, 
problems quickly surfaced with American Airlines’ fleet of MD-80s. On 
March 25 and 26, 2008, FAA inspectors found discrepancies with some of 
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American Airlines’ MD-80s, and American grounded part of its fleet, cancel-
ing a few 100 flights. On April 7, 2008, just 3 days after the congressional 
hearings arising from the SWA events, FAA inspectors re-inspected 17 of 
American Airlines’ MD-80s and found 16 of them to be out of compliance 
with AD 2006-15-15. On April 8, faced with the prospect of imminent 
enforcement action by the FAA, American Airlines chose to ground its entire 
fleet of MD-80’s (more than 350 planes), putting these planes back into ser-
vice only when the AD requirements had been completely met, and were to 
the FAA’s satisfaction. From April 8 to 11, American Airlines canceled 3,100 
flights, stranding or inconveniencing more than 250,000 passengers (United 
States of America, Department of Transportation, Report of the Independent 
Review Team, 2008).
Analysis
The FAA’s voluntary disclosure programs clearly involved multiple account-
ability frames that structured operations within the network. As a routine 
matter, they seem to work well, indicating that the shift to a process-oriented 
regulatory approach has led to increased safety (Mouawad & Drew, 2013). 
However, trade-offs between accountability frames within regulatory net-
works can lead to breakdowns in accountability and eventually crises, as the 
SWA case illustrates. We will examine the accountability structures both 
under routine operations and during an extreme incident—the Southwest 
case.
Routine Operations
The shift to process-oriented accountability has led to a shift from actors 
pursuing their own, narrowed accountability frames and instead expanded to 
include a more collaborative accountability framework to ensure the safety of 
aviation operations in the United States (Table 3). Collaborative accountabil-
ity is evident in ASAP as the FAA, air carrier, and unions work collabora-
tively to identify and fix potential safety hazards that occur during routine 
operations. Within ASAP, the ERC (and the MOU that codifies the relation-
ship) serves as a collaborative body that helps to minimize other accountabil-
ity frames that each actor brings to the table. Specifically, while air carriers 
remain interested in minimizing compliance costs, their participation in 
ASAP illustrates that the reputation of a safe industry has become a shared 
norm, and deeply integrated into their shareholder accountability frame. This 
is further evident in the willingness of air carriers to share de-identified ASAP 
and VDRP data with other air carriers and FAA headquarters through ASIAS. 
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(to whom is account 
rendered?)
Application to FAA voluntary self-




Funding for inspectors through 
appropriations process. Requests for 
reports on operation of ASAP and 




Limited involvement due to Freedom Of 
Iinfomation Act (FOIA) protections of 
ASAP and VDRP disclosures.
Legal (Courts) FAA retains right to pursue legal and 
punitive action against air carriers and 
employees for non-disclosed violations. 
Limited involvement by outside legal 
entities due to non-discoverability of 
ASAP and VDRP disclosures in legal 
proceedings.
Market Shareholder/owner Desire of air carriers to protect 
reputation of their company and the 
industry for safety while also earning 
profits for shareholders by minimizing 
cost of corrective actions in ASAP and 
VDRP processes.
Consumer Limited due to inability to make 
informed choice on relative safety of 
carriers because of ASAP and VDRP 
confidentiality.
Labor Desire of air carrier employee unions 
to protect membership from punitive 
action and play a participatory role in 
enforcing safety standards during ASAP 
and VDRP processes. Also, desire 
by public sector unions to pursue 
additional inspector hiring and protect 




Desire by local FAA inspectors to avoid 
high-profile incident by following 
ASAP and VDRP guidance and by using 
data collected through disclosures to 
identify weaknesses in air carrier safety 
program.
(continued)
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Focusing on the reputational aspects of shareholder accountability makes 
collaboration with regulators and employees vital for air carriers who work to 
protect their reputation by proactively addressing safety hazards in their orga-
nizations through the FAA’s self-disclosure programs.
Similarly, FAA inspectors lessen their reliance on bureaucratic account-
ability to foster collective accountability by relying more heavily on report-
ing programs such as ASAP and VDRP, and targeted inspections informed by 
the data collected through those programs. In addition, FAA inspectors show 
deference to collaborative accountability by not using information disclosed 
through ASAP and VDRP as the basis of punitive actions such as letters of 
investigation against employees or air carriers. That said, the FAA often does 
rely on bureaucratic accountability in the implementation of ASAP by fol-
lowing published agency procedures to ensure that each partner in the pro-




(to whom is account 
rendered?)
Application to FAA voluntary self-




Desire by FAA inspectors, air carriers, 
and union employees to learn from 
ASAP and VDRP reports at the local 
level through CASS and ATOS and at 
national level through ASIAS. Analysis 
is used to inform internal air carrier 
audits and FAA inspection activities.
Collaborative (peers, 
partners)
Air carriers, local FAA, and unions 
working together to improve safety 
through data sharing and analysis in 
ASAP ERCs. Achieving consensus 
for corrective actions through ASAP 
ERCs. Air carrier and local FAA 
office developing corrective action 
for systemic issues identified through 
VDRP. Air carriers sharing de-identified 
data with FAA through ASIAS to 
identify crosscutting safety issues at 
national level.
Note. FAA = Federal Aviation Administration; ASAP = Aviation Safety Action Program; 
VDRP = Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program; ERC = Event Review Committee; CASS = 
Continuing Analysis and Surveillance System; ATOS = Air Transportation Oversight System; 
ASIAS = Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing.
Table 3. (continued)
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Finally, employee union representatives often rely less on formalized 
labor accountability (grievance processes, strikes) and more on informally 
driven labor accountability predicated on a culture of cooperation when par-
ticipating in ASAP ERCs by agreeing to encourage its membership to report 
and share the facts of violations to both the FAA and the air carrier. The cul-
ture of cooperation builds the capacity for the industry to forge “win-win” 
expectations between labor (pilots and maintenance workers in particular), 
shareholders and managers, and federal regulators. However, as our inter-
viewees note, trade-offs between management and labor still exist even in 
this more collaborative environment. Cooperative labor relations climate 
have been found to positively influence levels of organizational commitment 
and union loyalty, as well as productivity and quality of services (Deery & 
Iverson, 2005, p. 600).
Importantly, the participation of the FAA, air carrier, and employee union 
in ASAP and VDRP is rooted in trust among the partners that each will oper-
ate in good faith and hold one another accountable only within the construct 
of the programs. In addition, the structural features of the programs including 
the de-identification of reporters, the confidentiality of reports, and the 
exemption from FOIA requests help to build trust through repeated collabo-
ration and demonstrate a generally effective way of garnering a deeper and 
more goal aligned sense of accountability between shareholders, labor 
unions, and federal bureaucracies like the FAA. However, the focus on col-
laborative accountability within ASAP and VDRP has come at the expense of 
more democratic accountability mechanisms. As Table 3 illustrates, the pro-
tection of information contained within ASAP and VDRP disclosures limits 
the ability of citizens and consumer groups to know which air carriers are 
safer than others. While the FAA retains the ability to pursue civil penalties 
against air carriers and enforcement action against pilots, mechanics, and so 
on, legal accountability for those who may be injured due to a safety hazard 
identified in a self-disclosure is limited—not because access to the court is 
barred, but because the information needed to prove violation or other negli-
gence may be protected against disclosure by the programs’ terms. Finally, 
accountability by elected representatives is not usually used during the nor-
mal operation of the FAA’s voluntary disclosure programs. However, the 
threat of one of the actors in ASAP or VDRP to involve an elected official in 
a dispute is a powerful incentive to operate in good faith. While each party 
has this option, engaging political or legal accountability is risky as it may 
open multiple parties, including the party filing the grievance letter to 
Congress, to criticism through hearings or counter-suits. It can also under-
mine the trust that allows collaborative accountability to work well most of 
the time. That risk can make participants hesitant to apply it without powerful 
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reasons. At the same time, democratic accountability can be an important 
counterbalance to a regulatory arrangement that has become overly collab-
orative as illustrated by the case of an abuse of VDRP by SWA.
The Challenges of Accountability in Process-Oriented Regulatory 
Regimes
The SWA incident illustrates that even effectively structured process-oriented 
regulatory regimes can be compromised by an overreliance on one type of 
accountability. In the SWA case, a close relationship between an FAA super-
visory inspector and SWA officials led to an overreliance on a collaborative 
accountability frame that turned into, essentially, conclusion, and a failure of 
bureaucratic accountability when the supervisory FAA inspector allowed 
SWA, whose Manager of Regulatory Compliance was a friend and former 
employee of the FAA CMO, to submit a disclosure to VDRP even though 
FAA inspector Boutris had raised concerns about the violations contained in 
the VDRP disclosure several months earlier. This example underscores the 
“value neutral” aspect of collaborative accountability, as collaborators may 
conspire to undertake actions, reinforce actions, or enable actions that work 
against the public goals of regulation.
Furthermore, following receipt of the disclosure, the FAA CMO allowed 
the SWA 737s to continue to fly even though they were out of compliance. In 
this instance, SWA appears to have been focused more on short-term share-
holder accountability through cost avoidance than on the possible damage to 
the company’s reputation from a large-scale problem or fine. More impor-
tantly, the failure of accountability in relation to SWA led to harsher sanctions 
when similar problems were discovered at American Airlines, which dam-
aged the reputation of the entire aviation industry.
The case also illustrates one of the primary weaknesses of VDRP com-
pared with ASAP, namely, the lack of labor accountability in the VDRP. The 
involvement of either the union representing FAA inspector Boutris or the 
union representing SWA mechanics would likely have prevented the SWA 
incident by bringing professional and labor accountability to the review of 
the claims made by Boutris. Instead, the close relationship between supervi-
sory FAA inspector and the SWA Manager of Regulatory Compliance led to 
an ineffective reliance on a narrow form of collaborative accountability that 
led to a failure of VDRP to ensure compliance. We find the success of the 
ASAP premised, at least in part, on the existence of a participatory decision-
making process involving labor.
The reaction to the SWA case illustrates how elected official accountabil-
ity can be used to improve the effectiveness of self-disclosure programs. 
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When members of Congress learned of the violations at the Southwest CMO 
and SWA, they called a hearing that put pressure on the FAA to conduct a full 
safety audit of all major air carriers, thus putting an emphasis on professional 
and bureaucratic accountability. The SWA case also illustrates that high-pro-
file events can change the dynamics of accountability within regulatory net-
works by increasing the salience of the issues in play (Gormley, 1986). 
During routine operations, consumer and legal accountability tend to be min-
imized by other forms of accountability. However, following a Congressional 
hearing, consumers became acutely aware of safety issues in both Southwest 
and American Airlines. Legal accountability played an increased role after 
the Congressional hearing as both air carriers faced significant civil penalties 
following the FAA’s safety audit, acting as a counterweight to collaborative 
accountability. Because of the protections on voluntary self-disclosures, the 
opportunities for consumer and legal accountability in aviation safety net-
works are often limited to after major incidents.
However, legal accountability was not a significant deterrent prior to the 
discovery of violations outside of the VDRP process. Specifically, the FAA’s 
process for issuing civil penalties for non-compliant aircraft is calculated 
using a publicly available fine amount per aircraft operation. As the air carrier 
continued to fly non-compliant aircraft, the legal (and financial) implications 
became much more pronounced, leading to a stronger incentive not to truth-
fully self-disclose the violations. This suggests a possible limitation to the 
desire of many regulatory agencies to maintain the ability to issue punitive 
penalties to firms that do not disclose violations.
Conclusion
Within regulatory networks, there are many accountability frames that inter-
act to ensure compliance with rules and laws. In the case of aviation safety, 
ensuring that these accountability frameworks are aligned is of utmost impor-
tance given the serious risk a breakdown of accountability poses for travelers. 
The FAA’s current approach to regulatory oversight—namely, through the 
use of voluntary disclosure programs—has resulted in the institutionalization 
of collaborative accountability mechanisms, while minimizing the dominant 
accountability frames associated with each actor responsible for ensuring 
regulatory compliance (in this case, the shareholder accountability of the air 
carriers and the regulatory bureaucratic accountabilities of FAA regulators). 
Specifically, the structural elements of the FAA’s voluntary programs includ-
ing the involvement of multiple stakeholders, the threat of fines if air carriers 
do not submit, and the promise of confidentiality of those who submit reports 
serve as important balancing mechanisms to keep each actor honest and 
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improve the overall effectiveness of the programs. This suggests that as regu-
lators continue to design process-oriented regulatory programs, they must 
include programmatic elements that allow for collaboration among actors 
(i.e., the good cop), while still retaining the ability to issue punitive sanctions 
against those who do not operate in good faith (i.e., bad cop). However, as 
our analysis of the SWA case illustrates, the threat of a significant fine that 
builds overtime can lead to a disincentive to self-disclose violations—reduc-
ing the overall level of compliance.
Several lessons emerge from the FAA’s experience with voluntary self-
disclosure programs that can inform the transition to process-oriented regula-
tory regimes in other complex industries such as banking, mining, and oil 
exploration. First as the SWA case illustrates, collaborative accountability 
can have significant potential limitations. As industry, regulators, and unions 
become more intertwined, the risk for regulatory capture and noncompliance 
may increase if regulators and legislators do not balance overarching collab-
orative accountabilities that pervade in successful process-based regulation 
with other accountability mechanisms (for instance, bureaucratic account-
ability through FAA inspections and the value of strong labor accountability 
in the ASAP). The most important contributing feature to the success of vol-
untary self-disclosure programs—trust between all partners—can lead to an 
overreliance on collaborative accountability without the balance of profes-
sional or bureaucratic accountability. Relying on professional best practices 
or established program guidance can reduce the risk of capture or overly 
close relationships between regulators and firms. Second, labor accountabil-
ity offers an important counterbalance to shareholder accountability that can 
work to improve the reputation and performance of an individual firm and 
entire industry. While aviation may be a unique industry, a high-profile disas-
ter in other industries would also result in increased political attention that 
could damage the reputation of the individual firm or the industry as a whole 
through lawsuits (legal accountability) or a loss of profit (shareholder 
accountability). Involving employees and their unions in the analysis of 
safety data can help to mitigate potential incidents while also utilizing the 
expertise of employees (professional accountability).
Our application of the governance network accountability framework to 
the self-regulation of the airline industry reveals the important role that labor 
unions play within the complex array of competing, commingling, and con-
joining accountability pressures found within this case. We analyzed the 
overall structure and functionality of process-based regulatory programs like 
the ASAP and VDRP and by focusing in on a relevant “worst case” scenario 
in which near tragedy was averted when the VDRP’s accountability frame-
work failed. This examination of a narrower case within a system-wide case 
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underscores the dynamic nature of the hybridized accountability regimes 
found within process-oriented regulatory networks like the one studied here. 
As the case of SWA underscores, accountability trade-offs will surface and 
recede as contextual pressures ebb and flow over time. By applying the net-
work accountability framework to this and other cases of regulatory failure in 
similarly high-reliability industries, we may be in a better position to design 
or redesign process-oriented compliance programs that are effective and con-
sist enough to ensure continuity of regulatory goal attainment.
Our analysis also has several implications for aviation safety regulators in 
other nations who use or are designing voluntary reporting programs. First, 
much of the success of voluntary reporting programs depends upon the abil-
ity of industry management and labor unions to build trust to work collabora-
tively to ensure safety. As aviation safety regulators consider how to design 
programs, it may be necessary to include trust-building forums and mecha-
nisms to build a requisite level of trust for voluntary reporting programs to 
operate effectively. Second, many nations around the world are seeing new 
low-cost carriers begin operations. Often, new and smaller carriers lack the 
institutional capacity and resources to fully implement voluntary programs 
and are reluctant to participate. Designing incentives and resources to assist 
these new carriers is vital to avoid the possibility of freeloading across the 
industry. Finally, the FAA has benefited from collaborative data sharing 
across the aviation system (i.e., airports, air traffic control, manufacturers, 
etc.). Encouraging adoption of these programs across all aspects of the avia-
tion system, including private air navigation service providers (ANSPs), 
increases their robustness and effectiveness.
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